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Abstract
When two players achieve a superclassical score at a nonlocal game, their outputs must contain
intrinsic randomness. This fact has many useful implications for quantum cryptography. Recently it has
been observed (C. Miller, Y. Shi, Quant. Inf. & Comp. 17, pp. 0595-0610, 2017) that such scores also
imply the existence of local randomness — that is, randomness known to one player but not to the other.
This has potential implications for cryptographic tasks between two cooperating but mistrustful players.
In the current paper we bring this notion toward practical realization, by offering near-optimal bounds
on local randomness for the CHSH game, and also proving the security of a cryptographic application of
local randomness (single-bit certified deletion).
Device-independent quantum cryptography [8, 11] is based on the observation that any Bell inequality
violation guarantees the existence of intrinsic randomness. In particular, the outputs of such an inequality
are known to be unpredictable to an arbitrary adversary. Work in this field over more than a decade has
culminated in recent proofs of security for quantum key distribution and randomness expansion that are
immune to any errors in quantum hardware [23, 24, 12, 14, 7, 5].
It has more recently been observed [13] that when two spatially separated parties violate a Bell inequality,
then the outputs of either player must contain some unpredictability to the other player. Whereas global
randomness (randomness possessed by both parties) is useful in cryptographic tasks in which two players are
cooperating, local randomness (randomness possessed by one party and unknown to the other) is potentially
useful in cryptographic settings where the parties are interacting but do not trust one another. This invites
an exploration of quantum cryptographic protocols that are immunized both against imperfections in the
quantum hardware and (possibly coordinated) cheating by one of the players.
Suppose that a nonlocal game G with complete support1 is played by two players, Alice and Bob, where
Alice’s input and output alphabets are A and X , respectively, and Bob’s input and output alphabets are B
and Y, respectively. A referee chooses an input pair (a, b) according to a fixed distribution and distributes
a to Alice and b to Bob, who return x and y respectively. The results of [13] assert that if the expected
score of Alice and Bob’s strategy exceeds the best possible classical score by , then Bob will not be able to
guess Alice’s output with probability better than (1−ΩG(2)), even if he were given Alice’s input. In other
words, the pair (a, x) is necessarily more random to Bob than the input letter a alone. This is an example of
blind randomness expansion, where the word “blind” is used because one player is blind to the randomness
generated by the other. (This can be compared to the notion of “bound randomness” in the three-party
setting of [1].)
∗This work was supported by NSF grant 1526928.
1A nonlocal game G has complete support if the input distribution is nonzero on all elements of A× B.
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The results of [13] are highly general but numerically weak. The goals of the current paper are (1) to
demonstrate techniques that prove numerically strong bounds on local randomness, and (2) to demonstrate
the power of local randomness by proving security for a specific application (one-shot certified deletion). Our
study is focused on two example games, the CHSH game and the Magic Square game.
Section 1 reviews some necessary background and then Section 2.1 outlines the Navascues-Pironio-Acin
(NPA) hierarchy [15], which has been previously used to prove lower bounds on global randomness [16].
The key difference in the case of local randomness is that we must bound the behavior of a party (Bob)
who is making two sequential measurements on a single system, rather than a single measurements on two
separated systems as in the case of global randomness. Fortunately, the NPA hierarchy can be adapted to
handle sequential measurements, as observed in [6, 17]. Using such an adapted approach, we compute a
function F such that any superclassical score of s at the CHSH game guarantees that Bob cannot recover
Alice’s output with probability greater than F (s). The function F that we obtain is shown to be optimal
within a margin of 0.02. (See Figure 1).
A downside of the CHSH game is that, even when a perfectly optimal strategy is used by Alice and Bob,
Bob still has approximately an 85% chance of guessing Alice’s output bit. For some cryptographic purposes
it is more useful for the player to have a bit that approximates a perfect coin flip. In Section 3 we study the
Magic Square game. This game is large enough that is computationally difficult to apply the methods from
Section 2, and so instead we apply the notion of quantum rigidity, which asserts that certain nonlocal games
have unique winning strategies. It was recently shown that the Magic Square game [25] is rigid. We build off
of the proof in [25] to show that in any strategy for Magic Square which achieves an expected score of 1− ,
Alice obtains a bit that Bob cannot guess with probability greater than 1/2 +O(
√
). (See Corollary 3.)
Lastly, in Section 4 we provide an initial application of device-independent local randomness by showing
that it enables single-bit certified deletion. In this cryptographic problem, Bob possesses an encrypted bit
m which could be read with a key, k, possessed only by Alice, and the goal is for Alice and Bob to interact
through classical communication only so that Bob can certifiably delete his copy of m . The resulting
deleted state must be unreadable even if Bob were to later learn k. We prove that any multi-use device that
performs well at the Magic Square game can be used for certified deletion. A formal statement is given in
Theorem 4. Roughly, the probability that Bob can recover the bit m after deletion is shown to be no more
than 12 +O(
√
), where  denotes the average probability that the device loses the Magic Square game, and
the probability that Bob can recover m before deletion is 1−O().
Our result can be compared to other cryptographic tasks for mistrustful parties in the device-independent
setting. Coin-flipping and bit commitment have been proven in the device-independent setting [20, 4, 3] with
constant (rather than vanishing) bias. Also, strong cryptographic primitives have been proven under addi-
tional assumptions such as limited quantum storage [10, 19, 18] and relativistic assumptions [2]. Exploring
the upper limits of device-independence in the mistrustful setting appears to be an interesting open problem.
1 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the concepts that formally define nonlocal games and related notations used
through out this paper, starting with the definition of a 2-player correlation.
Our notation follows [13]. Let A,B denote Alice’s and Bob’s input alphabets, respectively, and let X ,Y
denote Alice’s and Bob’s output alphabets. A 2-player (input-output) correlation is a vector (P (xy|ab)) of
nonnegative reals, where (x, y, a, b) varies over X × Y ×A× B, such that∑
xy
P (xy|ab) = 1
for all pairs (a, b), and such that the quantities
P (x|a) := ∑y P (xy|ab), P (y|b) := ∑x P (xy|ab)
are independent of b and a, respectively. (The latter conditions are referred to as the “non-signaling”
constraints.)
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A 2-player game is a pair (q,H) where
q : A× B → [0, 1] (1)
is a probability distribution and
H : A× B × X × Y → [0, 1] (2)
is a function. If q(a, b) 6= 0 for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B, the game is said to have a complete support. The
expected score associated to such a game for a 2-player correlation (P (xy|ab)) is∑
a,b,x,y
q(a, b)H(a, b, x, y)P (xy|ab). (3)
A 2-player strategy is a 5-tuple
Γ = (D,E, {{Aax}x}a, {{Bby}y}b,Ψ) (4)
such that D,E are finite dimensional Hilbert spaces, {{Aax}x}a is a family of X -valued positive operator
valued measures (POVMs) on D (indexed by A), {{Bby}y}b is a family of Y-valued positive operator valued
measures on E, and Ψ is a density operator on D ⊗ E. In this paper, we assume without loss of generality
that Ψ is pure, written as Ψ = |ψ〉 〈ψ|, and that the operators Aax and Bby are all projectors. We say that
the strategy Γ achieves the 2-player correlation (P (xy|ab)) if P (xy|ab) = Tr[Ψ(Aax ⊗ Bby)] for all a, b, x, y.
A correlation is a quantum correlation if it can be achieved by such a 2-player strategy.
2 Local randomness from the NPA hierarchy
The goal of this section is to derive an upper bound on Bob’s probability of guessing Alice’s after playing
the CHSH game with her. The method we use is based on the Navascues-Pironio-Acin hierarchy which is
introduced in the next subsection.
2.1 Navascues-Pironio-Acin hierarchy
The Navascues-Pironio-Acin hierarchy, or NPA hierarchy, was introduced to characterize quantum correla-
tions. We briefly sketch the idea behind the hierarchy and refer the reader to [15] for the formal treatment.
The NPA hierarchy is an infinite series of conditions which must be satisfied by any quantum correlation.
In the measurement scenario, we assume Alice and Bob share state |ψ〉 and will apply some measurements
determined by the inputs. For compatibility with [15], we use a different notation in this section and assume
that each output letter is associated to a unique input letter — i.e., each output letter x ∈ X is uniquely
associated to a single input A(x). If Alice is given input a, then her only valid outputs are those for which
a = A(x).
A behavior P in this measurement scenario is a set of nonnegative values P = {P (x, y) : x ∈ X , y ∈ Y}
such that
∑
x∈a,y∈b P (x, y) = 1 for any a ∈ A, b ∈ B. The definition of a quantum behavior is as follows.
(As we will discuss, it is somewhat different from the definition of quantum correlation.)
Definition 1. A behavior P is a quantum behaviour if there exists a pure state |ψ〉 in a Hilbert space H, a
set of measurement operators {Ex : x ∈ X} for Alice, and a set of measurement operators {Ey : y ∈ Y} for
Bob, such that ∀x ∈ X and ∀y ∈ Y
P (x, y) = 〈ψ|ExEy|ψ〉, (5)
with the measurement operators E satisfying
1. E†x = Ex and E
†
y = Ey,
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2. ExEx¯ = δxx¯Ex if A(x) = A(x¯) and EyEy¯ = δyy¯Ey if B(y) = B(y¯),
3.
∑
x∈A−1(a)Ex = I and
∑
y∈B−1(b)Ey = I for all a, and
4. [Ex, Ey] = 0.
The first three properties ensure that the operators Ex and Ey are projectors and define proper mea-
surements. The fourth property ensures that the measurements by Alice and Bob do not interfere with one
another. This definition is similar to the definition of a quantum correlation, but is based on commutativity
rather than bipartiteness. Under these definitions, every quantum correlation yields a quantum behavior
(i.e., by setting Ex = Aax ⊗ I, Ey = I⊗Bby) but not necessarily vice versa [21].
The idea of the hierarchy is that if we let O be any finite set of operators that can be expressed as finite
products of elements of the set {Ex}x ∪ {Ey}y (for example, Ex or ExEyEy′), then the matrix Γ given by
Γij = 〈ψ|O†iOj |ψ〉 (6)
where Oi, Oj vary over the elements of O, must be positive semidefinite. Additionally, there are some
independent equalities (which depend on the setting) that must be satisfied by the entries of Γ.
We define a sequence of such matrices (certificates) as follows. Since some of the Oi’s can be expressed
in multiple ways as products of operators from {Ex}x ∪ {Ey}y, we define the length of the operator to be
the minimum number of projectors needed to generate it. For any k ≥ 1, the kth certificate matrix Γ(k)
is the matrix associated to the set O of all operators of length at most k. The fact that Γ(k) must be
positive semidefinite constrains the possible entries in Γ(k), and in particular constrains the values P (x, y) =
〈ψ | ExEy | ψ〉 which can occur in a quantum behavior. Thus we obtain a hierarchy of constraints on the
set of all quantum behaviors.
Measuring the amount of local randomness after a nonlocal game is not as simple as constraining quantum
behaviors (Definition 1) since in particular, measurements that Bob uses to guess Alice’s output may not
commute with the measurements he used to play the game. Fortunately, the NPA hierarchy can also be
adapted to scenarios which involve sequential measurements [6, 17]. In the next subsection, we apply an
adaptation of the NPA hierarchy to study local randomness for the CHSH game.
2.2 Application of the NPA hierarchy
The CHSH game is defined on alphabets X = Y = A = B = {0, 1}, and the input probability
q(a, b) = 1/4 (7)
for all a, b. The score function is
H(a, b, x, y) = x⊕ y ⊕ ¬(a ∧ b). (8)
for all a, b, x, y.
As usual, we assume that Alice and Bob share some pure state |ψ〉. First, Alice gets input a ∈ A and
outputs x ∈ X . Bob gets input b ∈ B and outputs y ∈ Y. Then, Bob gets Alice’s input a and outputs x′ ∈ X .
Alice’s projective measurement for input a and output x is Aax. Similarly, the projective measurement
operator for input b and output y is Bby. To guess Alice’s output, Bob’s projective measurement is B
′
abx′
after he gets Alice’s input a and outputs x′ ∈ X .
In the semidefinite programming instance, the objective value is Bob’s guessing probability, denoted by
P2. The constraints include the expression of P1 and the commutation relations. Both P1 and P2 can be
expressed by Aax, Bby and B
′
abx′ . The expressions can be found in Appendix A. We use the third-order
certificate to maximize P2 for a given P1 and get the following data.
The P2 values are 1, 0.995645, 0.977018, 0.95783, 0.938371, 0.918742, 0.898992, 0.879149 and 0.859229
when P1 is ranging from 0.75 to 0.85 (see Figure 1). These points indicate the proved upper bound on Bob’s
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guessing probability. Next, we derive a lower bound on P2 to show how close the upper bound is to the
actual optimal guessing probability.
First note that the optimal strategy for CHSH involves Alice and Bob sharing a Bell state |Φ+〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), and Alice performing the X or Z measurement when her input is 0 or 1, respectively, and
Bob performing the (X + Z)/
√
2 or (X − Z)/√2 measurement when his input is 0 or 1, respectively. This
strategy achieves a score of 12 +
√
2
4 at CHSH, and moreover Bob can guess Alice’s output given her input
with probability 12 +
√
2
4 , by simply guessing x⊕ (a ∧ b).
Consider the scenario where Alice and Bob share a random coin R. With probability r or 1− r, the coin
R has value 0 or 1, respectively. If R = 0, then Alice and Bob always output 0, and if R = 1, then Alice
and Bob play the optimal CHSH strategy. In the former case, Bob can perfectly guess Alice’s output, while
in the latter case, he can guess her output with probability 12 +
√
2
4 .
Therefore, the expressions of P1 and P2 in terms of r for this strategy are
P1(r) =
3
4
r +
2 +
√
2
4
(1− r) (9)
P2(r) = 1 · r + 2 +
√
2
4
(1− r). (10)
Then the expression of P2 in terms of P1 is
P2 = 1 +
3
√
2
4
−
√
2P1. (11)
To generate the plot in Figure 1, we plot the lower bound first. Then we mark the proved data points of
the upper bound and connect then with dashed lines to indicate the approximate shape of the upper bound.
For the upper bound point above 1, we cut it off by the line y = 1.
Figure 1: Plot of the lower and approximate upper bounds of P2 against P1 ∈ (0.75, 0.85).
The optimal (blind) rate curve for CHSH must lie in between the orange and blue curves in Figure 1.
3 Local randomness from rigidity
For games with larger alphabets than the CHSH game, using the above adaptation of the NPA hierarchy is
more difficult because of the size of the certificates. In the current section we explore how techniques from
quantum rigidity can be used to prove blind rate curves. The approach in the current section requires less
computation than the NPA hierachy approach, and although the rate curve we achieve lacks the near-optimal
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properties of our rate curve for CHSH (Figure 1), it is optimal as the score threshold approaches the optimal
quantum score.
We study the Magic Square game, which, like CHSH, is a game with two players, Alice and Bob. The
input alphabets for Alice and Bob are A = B = {0, 1, 2}, the input distribution q is uniform, and the output
alphabets are the sets of bit strings X = {000, 011, 101, 110} for Alice and Y = {100, 010, 001, 111} for Bob.
The game is won if the inputs a, b and outputs x, y satisfy xb = ya, meaning that the b-th bit of x equals the
a-th bit of y.
A strategy for the Magic Square game consists of a pure state |ψ〉 ∈ HA⊗HB , and projective measurement
families {{Aax}x}a on HA and
{
{Bby}y
}
b
on HB . Note that we can let
F zab =
∑
xb=z
Aax (12)
Gzab =
∑
ya=z
Bby (13)
Fab = F
0
ab − F 1ab (14)
Gab = G
0
ab −G1ab, (15)
and then the measurements will satisfy ∏
b
Fab = I (16)∏
a
Gab = −I (17)
FabFab′ = Fab′Fab (18)
GabGa′b = Ga′bGab (19)
F 2ab = I (20)
G2ab = I. (21)
The measurement operators Aax and Bby can be recovered from {Fab}, {Gab}, and thus to specify a strategy it
suffices to specify |ψ〉, {Fab}, {Gab} satisfying the above conditions. We refer to the triple (|ψ〉, {Fab}, {Gab})
as a reflection strategy for the Magic Square game.
Suppose that a reflection strategy (|ψ〉, {Fab}, {Gab}) achieves a score of 1 − δ. Appendix B proves the
following inequalities for any a, a′, b, b′ ∈ {0, 1, 2} with a 6= a′, b 6= b′, using steps from the proof of rigidity
for the Magic Square game [25]:
‖Fab ⊗Gab |ψ〉 − |ψ〉‖ ≤ 6
√
δ (22)
‖FabFa′b′ ⊗ I |ψ〉+ Fa′b′Fab ⊗ I |ψ〉‖ ≤ 6
√
δ (23)
The next proposition uses the above inequalities to prove that in a high-performing strategy, if Alice measures
with Fab and Bob measures with Ga′b′ , with a 6= a′, b 6= b′, then the outcome of Alice’s measurement is nearly
undetectable to Bob.
Proposition 2. Let a, a′, b, b′ ∈ {0, 1, 2}, z ∈ {0, 1} be such that a 6= a′, b 6= b′. Let (|ψ〉, {Fab}, {Gab})
be a reflection strategy for the Magic Square game which achieves an expected score of 1 − δ. Then, the
post-measurement states
TrA
[
(F 0ab ⊗Gza′b′)|ψ〉〈ψ|(F 0ab ⊗Gza′b′)
]
(24)
and
TrA
[
(F 1ab ⊗Gza′b′)|ψ〉〈ψ|(F 1ab ⊗Gza′b′)
]
(25)
are separated by trace distance at most 18
√
δ.
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Proof. Applying inequality (23), we have the following, in which we use the notation u =x v to denote that
the Euclidean distance between the vectors u and v is no more than x:
Fa′b′F
0
ab ⊗ I |ψ〉 = Fa′b′
(
I + Fab
2
)
⊗ I |ψ〉
=3
√
δ
(
I − Fab
2
)
Fa′b′ ⊗ I |ψ〉
= F 1abFa′b′ ⊗ I |ψ〉 .
Therefore,
Fa′b′F
0
ab ⊗Gza′b′ |ψ〉 =3√δ F 1abFa′b′ ⊗Gza′b′ |ψ〉
=6
√
δ F
1
ab ⊗Gza′b′Ga′b′ |ψ〉
= (−1)zF 1ab ⊗Gza′b′ |ψ〉
Therefore, since ‖uu∗ − vv∗‖1 ≤ 2 ‖u− v‖ for any unit vectors u, v, we find that the trace distance between
the projectors
(Fa′b′F
0
ab ⊗Gza′b′)|ψ〉〈ψ|(F 0abFa′b′ ⊗Gza′b′) (26)
and
(F 1ab ⊗Gza′b′)|ψ〉〈ψ|(F 1ab ⊗Gza′b′) (27)
is upper bounded by 18
√
δ. Applying the partial trace over HA to both projectors (and dropping the Fa′b′
terms, which become irrelevant), we obtain the desired result.
The next corollary follows easily.
Corollary 3. Let
(
|ψ〉, {{Aax}x}a ,
{
{Bby}y
}
b
)
be a strategy for the Magic Square game which achieves an
expected score of 1 − δ. Let a, b, b′ ∈ {0, 1, 2} be such that b 6= b′, and suppose that the strategy is executed
on inputs a, b and outputs x, y are obtained. Then the probability that Bob can subsequently guess xb′ given
b′ is no more than 12 + 9
√
δ.
4 The deletion certification protocol
We next focus on the problem of certified deletion, which we describe as follows. Alice wishes to interact
with an untrusted device (Da) and a second party (Bob) so as to prepare for herself a random bit m and a
classical string k, such that after the interaction is complete the following conditions hold:
(A) If Alice were to give k to Bob immediately, then Bob could recover the bit m.
(B) There is a deletion procedure that Alice and Bob can carry out, involving classical communication only,
such that after the protocol is over Bob will not be able to recover m even if he were given k.
Note that this procedure can be used as a form of encryption: if Alice has a predetermined secret message
bit y ∈ {0, 1} which she wishes to encrypt, then she can execute the same preparation procedure and then
transmit the XOR bit y⊕m to Bob. Recovering or deleting y is then equivalent to recovering or deleting m.
Variants of this problem have been studied in other settings (e.g., [22] in a computational setting, [19, 10]
in a bounded storage model). Our setting is the device-independent setting, where the honest user Alice does
not trust the quantum processes used in the protocol. Our protocol is based on the Magic Square game. We
make the following assumptions:
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1. Alice and Bob possess an untrusted 2-part device D = (Da, Db) which is compatible with the Magic
Square game.
2. Alice has the ability to generate private (trusted) randomness.
3. Alice’s device Da does not communicate information to Bob or to Db once the protocol is underway.
4. Alice and Bob have the ability to communicate classically.
No assumptions are made about Bob’s behavior — in particular, he may perform arbitrary operations on
any quantum information that is contained inside of the device Db that he possesses.2
It is helpful to change notation from the previous section. The protocol will contain two sequence of inputs
to the Magic Square game, one for Alice and one for Bob, which will be denoted by va = (va1 , v
a
2 . . . v
a
N )
and vb = (vb1, v
b
2 . . . v
b
N ). The sequences of the outputs will be h
a = (ha1 , h
a
2 . . . h
a
N ) for Alice and h
b =
(hb1, h
b
2 . . . h
b
N ) for Bob. The initial preparation protocol is given Figure 2.
Participants: Alice, Bob
Equipment: A 2-part untrusted device D = (Da, Db) which is compatible with the Magic Square game.
Parameters: N ∈ N,  ∈ [0, 1/9].
1. Alice generates uniformly random sequences va, vb ∈ {0, 1, 2}N and chooses a random round t ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N}. She chooses r ∈ {0, 1, 2}r {vbt} at random.
2. Alice gives inputs va1 , . . . , v
a
N sequentially to her device and records outputs h
a
1 , . . . , h
a
N .
3. Alice sets m to be equal to the rth bit of hat and sets k be equal to the 4-tuple (v
b, t, r, vat ).
Figure 2: The preparation protocol (PREP )
We wish to show first that it is possible for Bob to determine m if he were given k. This is straightforward:
if the device D = (Da, Db) were such that it wins the Magic Square game with probability 1−  at each use,
then the protocol in Figure 3 successfully determines m with probability 1− .
4. Alice sends k to Bob.
5. Bob gives the inputs vb1, . . . , v
b
t−1, r, v
b
t+1, . . . , v
b
N in sequence to his device and records outputs
hb1, . . . , h
b
N .
6. Bob sets m′ to be equal to the (vat )th bit of h
b
t .
Figure 3: The recovery protocol (REC)
Next we wish to show that there is a protocol which makes m unrecoverable for Bob (even while it allows
Bob to know the key k after the protocol is completed, and allows him to have access to all remaining
quantum information in the device Db). We use the protocol DEL in Figure 4, which is also meant to follow
the protocol PREP in Figure 2. The protocol has Bob play his side of the Magic Square game and then
2We could model Bob’s behavior simply by allowing him to possess a quantum system Q and to perform arbitrary operations
on it. We have chosen to allow him to have a device because it is easier to express his behavior in the case where he is honest.
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has Alice check the resulting score. Then at the conclusion of the protocol, Alice reveals the key k to Bob
(which is merely a convenience for stating the security of the protocol).
4. For i = 1, 2, . . . , N , Alice sends Bob the input vbi and Bob sends back an output h
b
i .
5. Alice computes the average score at the Magic Square game (across N rounds) achieved by the
input sequences va, vb and output sequences ha,hb. If this average is greater than or equal to 1−,
she accepts Bob’s responses; otherwise, she aborts the protocol.
6. Alice sends k to Bob.
Figure 4: The deletion protocol (DEL)
Note that at step 4 in Figure 4, the interactions must be done in sequence (i.e., Alice waits to receive hbi
before revealing vbi+1). Bob can use his device D
b to obtain his outputs, but we do not require that.
The following theorem asserts the security of the deletion protocol DEL. Let SUCC denote the event
that Alice “accepts” at step 5 in Figure 4.
Theorem 4. Assume that P (SUCC) > 0 in protocol DEL. Then, the probability that Bob can guess m at
the conclusion of the protocol, conditioned on SUCC, is upper bounded by
1
2
+ 9
√
+N−1/4 +
e−
√
N/2
P (SUCC)
. (28)
Note that if we fix a constant γ > 0, assume that P (SUCC) > γ, and let N tend to infinity, then the
upper bound (28) tends to 12 + 9
√
.
For the proof of Theorem 4, we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Let Ii denote indicator variable for the event that the ith round is won. Let
I ′i = E(Ii | Ii−1Ii−2 · · · I1), (29)
and let I
′
= (
∑
i I
′
i)/N . Then for any µ > 0,
Pr(SUCC ∧ (I ′ < 1− − µ)) ≤ e−Nµ
2
2 . (30)
Proof. Let I = (
∑
i Ii)/N . Let
Zi =
i∑
j=1
(Ij − I ′j). (31)
Then {Z0, Z1, . . . , ZN} is a martingale:
E(Zi+1|Zi, . . . , Z1) = Zi + E(Ii+1|Ii · · · I1)− I ′i+1 = Zi.
Therefore by Azuma’s inequality, the probability of the event
∑
i(Zi) > µ is upper bounded by e
−Nµ22 . The
event in inequality (30) implies
∑
i(Zi) > µ, and the desired result follows.
Now we can prove the main theorem of this section.
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Proof of Theorem 4. By Corollary 3, for any i and any c ∈ {0, 1, 2}r vbi , the probability that Bob can guess
the cth bit of hai is upper bounded by
1
2 + 9
√
1− I ′i. Therefore, the probability that Bob can guess m at the
conclusion of the protocol DEL is no more than[
N∑
i=1
(
1
2
+ 9
√
1− I ′i
)]
/N, (32)
which by the concavity of the square root function is upper bounded by
1
2
+ 9
√
1− I ′, (33)
For any µ > 0, we have by Lemma 5,
Pr[I
′ ≥ 1− − µ | SUCC] ≥ 1− e
−Nµ2/2
Pr(SUCC)
,
and therefore, conditioned on SUCC, Bob’s probability of guessing m is upper bounded by
1
2
+ 9
√
+ µ+
e−Nµ
2/2
Pr(SUCC)
. (34)
Setting µ = N−1/4 yields the desired result.
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A Expressions of P1 and P2
The winning probability of the CHSH game is
P1 = 1/4(P (00|00) + P (11|00) + P (00|01) + P (11|01)
+P (00|10) + P (11|10) + P (01|11) + P (10|11)),
where Pr(xy|ab) = 〈ψ|AaxBby|ψ〉. Since for any input a and b, Aa1 = I − Aa0 and Bb1 = I − Bb0, we can
express P1 in terms of the projectors as
P1 = 〈ψ|
(3
4
− 1
2
A00 − 1
2
B00 +
1
2
A00B00
+
1
2
A00B10 +
1
2
A10B00 − 1
2
A10B10
)|ψ〉. (35)
When Bob wants to guess Alice’s output x given a and b, the probability that he can guess correctly is
P2 = 1/4
∑
b,y
(
Pr(0y0|0b) + Pr(1y1|0b)
+Pr(0y0|1b) + Pr(1y1|1b)) (36)
where
Pr(xyx′|ab) = 〈ψ|A†axB†byB
′†
abx′B
′
abx′BbyAax|ψ〉
= 〈ψ|A†axB†byB′abx′Bby|ψ〉.
The measurement {{B′abx′}x′}ab is a set of measurements indexed by (a, b) ∈ A×B.3 The two measurements
{{Bby}y}b and {{B′abx′}x′}ab commute with {{Aax}x}a.
The probability P2 can be expressed in terms of the projectors as P2 =
1
4 〈ψ|S|ψ〉 with S defined as
1
4
S =I− 1
2
(A00 +A10)− 1
4
(B′000 +B
′
010 +B
′
100 +B
′
110)
+
1
2
(A00B
′
000 +A00B
′
010 +A10B
′
100 +A10B
′
110)
+
1
4
(B00B
′
000 +B
′
000B00 +B10B
′
010 +B
′
010B10 +B00B
′
100 +B
′
100B00 +B10B
′
110 +B
′
110B10)
−1
2
(A00B00B
′
000 +A00B
′
000B00 +B00B
′
000B00)−
1
2
(A00B10B
′
010 +A00B
′
010B10 +B10B
′
010B10)
−1
2
(A10B00B
′
100 +A10B
′
100B00 +B00B
′
100B00)−
1
2
(A10B10B
′
110 +A10B
′
110B10 +B10B
′
110B10)
+A00B00B
′
000B00 +A00B10B
′
010B10 +A10B00B
′
100B00 +A10B10B
′
110B10.
(37)
Here we use the relation B′ab1 = I−B′ab0 again.
B Proof of Inequalities (22)–(23)
We follow steps from the proof of rigidity for the Magic Square game in [25]. (See also [9], which performs
a similar derivation based on [25].) By symmetry, it suffices to address the single case where a = b = 0, a′ =
b′ = 1, so we will assume those values from now on. Denote the probability that Alice and Bob lose the
Magic Square game on inputs (i, j) by δij . The average of these quantities over all i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2} is equal to
δ. By linearity, we can compute the quantities δij from the reflection strategy via the following expression:
〈ψ|Fij ⊗Gij |ψ〉 = 1− 2δij . (38)
3Note that it not necessary to make Bob’s second measurement depend on the outcome of his first measurement, since that
outcome (y) is recoverable from the postmeasurement state of his first measurement.
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Therefore,
‖Fij ⊗Gij |ψ〉 − |ψ〉‖ =
√
2− 2 〈ψ|Fij ⊗Gij |ψ〉
= 2
√
δij ,
which proves (22), since 2
√
δij ≤ 2
√
9δ = 6
√
δ.
Let ij = 2
√
δij . We then have the following, in which we let the expression u =x v denote that the
Euclidean distance between the vectors u and v is no more than x.
F00F11 ⊗ I |ψ〉 =11 F00 ⊗G11 |ψ〉
= −F02F01 ⊗G21G01 |ψ〉
=01 −F02 ⊗G21 |ψ〉
=02 I ⊗G21G02 |ψ〉
= I ⊗G21G22G12 |ψ〉
=12 F12 ⊗G21G22 |ψ〉
=22 F12F22 ⊗G21 |ψ〉
=21 F12F22F21 ⊗ I |ψ〉
= F12F20 ⊗ I |ψ〉
=20 F12 ⊗G20 |ψ〉
= −F11F10 ⊗G00G10 |ψ〉
=10 −F11 ⊗G00 |ψ〉
=00 −F11F00 ⊗ I |ψ〉
Therefore, using the concavity of the square root function,
‖F00 ⊗G11 |ψ〉+ F11 ⊗G00 |ψ〉‖ ≤
∑
ij
ij
= 2
∑
ij
√
δij
= 2 · 9 ·
∑
ij
√
δij/9
≤ 2 · 9 ·
√∑
ij
δij/9
= 6
√
δ,
which implies (23) as desired.
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